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This essay considers Wollstonecraft’s engagement with her antagonist Edmund Burke in their 
responses to the French Revolution, in particular, their shared use of a language of feeling. I 
draw on recent critical analyses of the polemical use of sentimental language in the 1790s, but 
focus on Wollstonecraft and Burke’s appropriation of a particular language of feeling: the 
embodied processes through which people and animals think, react, and develop reasoned 
responses to the world. Both Wollstonecraft and Burke are fascinated by the operation of 
instincts, and their relation to reason. They understand the importance of instinct in social and 
political life very differently, however, and Wollstonecraft’s critique of Burke’s use of a 
language of instinct lays the ground for her challenge to his account of the French Revolution 
in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Wollstonecraft’s sustained engagement with 
instinctive processes forms a crucial part of her response to Burke in her Vindication of the 
Rights of Man (1790), and also informs her analysis of gendered inequalities in Vindication of 
the Rights of Woman (1792). Rather than make gender relations my focus in this essay, I assess 
the degree to which Wollstonecraft’s account of instinctive behaviours affects her account of 
political revolution and activism. I focus on the Vindication of the Rights of Men, but end by 
considering Wollstonecraft’s representation of revolutionary crowds in her Historical and 
Moral View of the French Revolution (1794). Wollstonecraft’s faith in the improvement of 
individuals and societies is shaken by the events of the Terror, which seem to demonstrate the 
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destructiveness of instinctive political action. As Eileen Hunt Botting has noted, 
Wollstonecraft’s response to the Terror even brings her work unexpectedly close to that of 
Burke (2006, 177). 
 
In stressing Wollstonecraft’s interest in embodied processes of communication and intellectual 
development, I follow recent critical accounts which emphasise the importance of the body in 
Wollstonecraft’s political writing. In her account of Wollstonecraft’s ‘medico-politics’, Amy 
Mallory-Kani stresses that Wollstonecraft’s ‘use of medicine… is not metaphorical, but a 
literal component of political change’ (21), a claim echoed by Diana Edelman-Young (688), 
and Sharon Ruston (31). These critics have focused on Wollstonecraft’s work for the Analytical 
Review, where she reviewed medical and natural history texts (Mallory-Kani 31; Edelman-
Young 683-4; Ruston 29). I discuss Wollstonecraft’s reviewing below, but rather than focus 
on medicine, I build on Ruston’s work, to consider the importance of natural history for 
Wollstonecraft’s account of the potential for improvement in individual and societies. This 
focus on Wollstonecraft’s understanding of embodied thinking and feeling processes offers an 
important rejoinder to claims that in celebrating the power of reason, her work creates a ‘mind-
body binarism’ in which the body is secondary (Keane 2000a, 30). Like Edelman-Young I 
suggest that Wollstonecraft’s use of natural history ‘dismantles the gender divide not only at 
the rhetorical level, but also at the level of the body’ (Edelman-Young 685). This knowledge 
also arms Wollstonecraft for her critique of Burke.  
 
Burke too is fascinated by and well-informed about the complexity of instinctive bodily and 
mental processes. Commentators have noted the importance of the body in his Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757). Garret Jeter argues 
that in the Enquiry ‘Burke privileges sense-experience… over the intellect as the dominant 
 3 
source of a human being’s phenomenological /epistemological experience and understanding’ 
(240). David Dwan concurs, but notes that Burke’s claim that our intuition of beauty is ‘an 
instinct that works us to its own purposes, without our concurrence’ suggests bodily feeling is 
not obviously instrumental in the Enquiry, but rather operates beyond the control of reason 
(578). Neither focus on the connection between Burke’s claims for the aesthetic in the Enquiry 
with his later political writings, but Richard Barney analyses Burke’s use of medical language 
in the Reflections, as well as the Enquiry, showing how Burke’s use of a language of contagion 
demonstrates that a ‘system of physiology could be provisionally mapped onto… France’s 
thoroughgoing scheme of revolutionary reform’ (233). Though persuaded by these accounts, I 
move away from assessments of Burke’s use of disease imagery in the Reflections, to consider 
the instinctive actions of the body.  
 
Like Wollstonecraft, Burke’s engagement with physiology and natural history may well result 
from his labours as a periodical writer. Burke edited the Annual Register from its first edition 
in 1759 until at least 1765, and maintained involvement perhaps until 1790 (Bromwich 1; 
Copeland 226-28). The periodical was an annual production, which included a ‘historical 
article’, poetry, antiquarianism, book reviews, miscellaneous essays, natural history, and 
accounts of ‘useful projects’. The contents were written and published anonymously, so it is 
difficult to state Burke’s authorship with certainty, but scholars have tended to agree that Burke 
wrote most or all of the content up to his entry into the House of Commons in 1765 (Copeland 
228). Here I investigate three Annual Register pieces from the ‘Natural History’ or ‘Essays’ 
sections, in the years 1764 and 1765. I proceed on the principle that if Burke did not write these 
pieces he would have had oversight of them as the Annual Register’s editor.  
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An essay ‘On the importance of an inquiry into the human mind’ (1764) notes that ‘the fabric 
of the human mind is curious and wonderful, as well as that of the human body’ (190). It 
focuses on the ‘instincts habits, associations, and other principles, which operate before we 
come to the use of reason’ (193), noting that these are ‘the powers which we have in common 
with the brutes’ (191). While human reason is distinct from animal instinct, it is impossible to 
‘trace’ the steps by which we move from instinctive to rational thought, and the essay therefore 
suggests a spectrum of intellectual development on which both humans and animals exist (193). 
In 1765, an article ‘On the great and extensive power of sympathy over the human frame’, 
examines the physiological phenomenon of sympathy, ‘a sense in human nature… so powerful, 
that it often disconcerts and overthrows the most obstinate designs and resolutions’ (81). The 
essay analyses examples in which instinctive sympathy causes individuals and groups to act 
irrationally, but does not read this as problematic or threatening. It concludes: ‘the foundation 
of arts, discipline, and the knowledge of the brightest things, is placed in the structure of the 
body’ (81). Despite the potentially violent effects of instinctive sympathy, the essay offers a 
remarkably matter-of-fact account.  
 
This calm tone is echoed in a review essay from the same edition, on the ‘Advantages of the 
social principle over a great understanding towards promoting the happiness of individuals’ 
(1765), which declares: ‘There is an universal principle of imitation among mankind which 
disposes them to catch instantaneously… the resemblance of any action or character that 
presents itself. This disposition we can often check by the force of reason… at other times, it 
is insurmountable’ (232). The essay presents examples which match those of the previous essay 
on sympathy, noting that ‘the communication of nervous disorders… is often so astonishing, 
that it has been referred to fascination or witchcraft... it is a fact well established, that… there 
is such a principle in nature as an healthy sympathy as well as a morbid infection’ (233). 
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Though these ‘disorders’ are physical in nature and resist explanation, the essay does not 
present them as a problem, suggesting instead that they can be used to cure social ills like 
loneliness and misanthropy. These essays suggest that Burke was aware of and may have 
written accounts of instinctive processes and their effects on social life. Each of these essays 
seems comfortable with instinct that operates beyond the control of reason, and even with the 
suggestion that human and animal instincts are manifestations of the same processes. 
Wollstonecraft however demonstrated none of this comfort, as the distinction between human 
reason and animal instinct was fundamental to her programme for personal and social 
improvement. 
 
Wollstonecraft reviews many natural history texts for the Analytical, and natural historical 
methods and arguments inform her political writings in important ways (Chandler 13; 
Edelman-Young 686). But Wollstonecraft’s use of natural history to support her claims finds 
a limit in her discussion of instinct. Ruston has traced the significance of Wollstonecraft’s 
account of instinct, understood as ‘a mechanical, natural, or an unthinking response to the 
world’, for her critique of gendered customs in the Vindication of the Rights of Woman (50). I 
focus here on Wollstonecraft’s account of social and political relations more broadly, but 
follow Ruston’s claims that Wollstonecraft’s reviews for the Analytical demonstrate the 
foundations of her thinking about instinct. Contemporary definitions of instinct emphasise, like 
the Annual Register pieces, that it is associated with animals. Ephraim Chambers’s 
Cyclopaedia declares it ‘a Disposition or natural Sagacity wherewith animals are endued… It 
bears some Analogy to Reason, and supplies the Defect of it in Brutes’ (vol. 2, 394). Samuel 
Johnson’s Dictionary defines it as a ‘Desire or aversion acting in the mind without the 
intervention of reason or deliberation; the power determining the will of brutes’ (vol. 1). 
Chambers makes instinct and reason ‘analogous’, whereas Johnson makes them independent, 
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but both make it a property of animals, or animal-like behaviour in humans. In her reviews of 
natural history texts, Wollstonecraft echoes Johnson’s claims, stressing that instinct functions 
in opposition to reason. 
 
Wollstonecraft’s most sustained engagement with instinct comes in her review of William 
Smellie’s Philosophy of Natural History (1790), in which Smellie argues that human reason is 
a more developed form of the instincts of animals. She notes: ‘With respect to the distinction 
between reason and instinct we are still in the dark’, but nonetheless offers a detailed critique 
of Smellie’s claims, declaring: ‘We cannot agree with Mr S. that instinct is only a lesser degree 
of reason’ (Works 7, 295-96). Wollstonecraft objects, first, that in insisting on the connections 
between humans and animals, Smellie threatens ‘to deprive us of souls’. Second, she notes that 
animals might seem rational, but they do not evolve and ‘improve’ from generation to 
generation: ‘If the beaver, the bee, or the termites, are directed by reason; the faculty of 
thinking, of comparing ideas and profiting by experience, they are superior to men; yet we do 
not find that their… senses ever enables them to transmit any portion of their acquired 
knowledge to their posterity’ (296). In contrast to human society, which develops and 
improves, ‘the result of their instincts seemed to be too sure for improvement, and too subtile 
for transmission’ (298).  
 
It proves difficult, however, for Wollstonecraft to dispel the link between human and animal 
that Smellie suggests. She notes of imitation, the instinctive way in which animals and people 
copy those around them, that  
[t]his principle in brutes continues in its full force throughout life, whilst that of man 
gives place to reason; this [Smellie] allows, when he says, ‘that the less a man has 
cultivated his rational faculties, the more powerful is the principle of imitation over his 
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actions and his habits of thinking!’… If reason, thought, or mind, is not something 
distinct from instincts or senses, what power compares the information they convey to 
us?... But we are straying into metaphysical labyrinths till we forget our province 
(Works 7, 299). 
Rather than operating as opposing faculties, instinct and reason appear here on a continuum. 
Humans, for Wollstonecraft, develop beyond instinctive imitation to reason, but the processes 
through which this occurs are lost in ‘metaphysical labyrinths’. More worrying is the 
suggestion that some humans never develop their ‘rational faculties’ to enable them to move 
beyond imitation. As Ruston notes, ‘it is important to Wollstonecraft that virtue is not an 
instinct, but is instead something that can be learned and worked towards’ (31); however, as 
Wollstonecraft’s political writings show, humans display this capacity for reason in varying 
degrees. Here and in her Vindications, human and animal behaviour do not seem to be absolute 
categories; rather they exist on a scale which makes humans capable of improvement, but also 
susceptible to a process of brutalization in which being treated like animals enables a loss of 
humanising reason and virtue (Ruston 33; Edelman-Young 688; Sapiro 80; Botting 2016, 110-
11). Here I investigate Wollstonecraft’s use of such ideas in her responses to Burke, in the 
Vindication of the Rights of Men and Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution. 
 
2. Vindication of the Rights of Men 
In the Vindication of the Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft’s critique of instinctive actions enables 
her to attack one of Burke’s major rhetorical strategies in the Reflections, in which he claims 
his response to events in France to be ‘natural’. Burke declares of the reformer Richard Price: 
‘Why do I feel so differently from the Reverend Dr. Price…? For this plain reason - because it 
is natural I should… because in those natural feelings we learn great lessons; because in events 
like these our passions instruct our reason’ (174-75). Burke’s account of ‘natural feelings’ 
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seems to come close to the Annual Register’s representation of instinctive actions as an 
interesting but unproblematic phenomenon. Wollstonecraft takes issue with Burke’s 
suggestion. As Barbara Taylor has shown, despite the importance of reason in Wollstonecraft’s 
scheme, she does not argue with Burke’s claim that ‘our passions instruct our reason’ (Taylor 
52). Instead, in her ‘Advertisement’ to the Vindication, Wollstonecraft notes: ‘my indignation 
was roused by the sophistical arguments, that every moment crossed me, in the questionable 
shape of natural feelings and common sense’ (Wollstonecraft 1790, iii). Wollstonecraft’s 
suggestion that Burke’s arguments are ‘sophistical’, and display false emotion is fundamental 
to her critique. But in addition, she throws doubt on the ethical weight of unscrutinised ‘natural 
feelings’. For Wollstonecraft, such feelings come too close to an unthinking, instinctive 
response. She makes this claim repeatedly in the Vindication, moving from her assertion that 
Burke ‘has a mortal antipathy to reason’ (9), to the instruction to ‘go hence, thou slave of 
impulse, look into the private recesses of thy heart’ (56). For Wollstonecraft, Burke’s ‘natural 
feelings’ bypass both the heart and the head. 
 
Wollstonecraft develops this argument in the Vindication in a passage where she notes the 
limitations of a purely physical response to suffering or injustice: 
Men who possess uncommon sensibility… soon forget the most forcible sensations. 
Not tarrying long enough in the brain to be subject to reflection, the next sensations… 
obliterate them… The sight of distress, or an affecting narrative, made… the heart, 
literally speaking, beat with sympathetic emotion. We ought to beware of confounding 
mechanical instinctive sensations with emotions that reason deepens, and justly terms 
the feelings of humanity. This word discriminates the active exertions of virtue from 
the vague declamation of sensibility (136-37). 
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Feeling is central to Wollstonecraft’s account of virtuous humanity. But such feeling must be 
connected with memory and reflection, to move it beyond a merely instinctive response. 
However, Wollstonecraft does not only find evidence of a tendency to instinctive responses in 
Burke’s language; she also detects it at the root of his model of political society. 
 
Burke declares in the Reflections that political wisdom, as well as political and economic 
power, should be inherited by each generation: ‘the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure 
principle of conservation… without at all excluding a principle of improvement… Thus, by 
preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve, we are never 
wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete’ (122). Burke, like Wollstonecraft, 
argues for a process of ‘improvement’ but makes this dependent on the experience and 
authority of previous generations. This model allows Burke to appeal again to feeling; he 
recommends ‘binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties; 
adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections’ (122). In addition, 
Burke argues that such inheritance is ‘natural’ and therefore right: ‘Through the same plan of 
a conformity to nature in our artificial institutions, and by calling in the aid of her unerring and 
powerful instincts, to fortify the fallible and feeble contrivances of our reason, we have derived 
several other… benefits’ (122-23). For Wollstonecraft, ‘unerring’ natural instincts should not 
be obeyed, but rather interrogated, if political actors are to act like humans and not beasts. 
Burke’s model of political inheritance is pernicious, because it corrupts humans’ true 
inheritance from God, the capacity not to act merely on instinct. 
 
In the Vindication Wollstonecraft counters Burke’s valorisation of tradition and precedent, 
taking on the language of the Reflections to declare: ‘It is necessary emphatically to repeat, that 
there are rights which men inherit at their birth, as rational creatures, who were raised above 
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the brute creation by their improveable faculties; and that, in receiving these, not from their 
forefathers but, from God, prescription can never undermine natural rights’ (22). The political 
stakes of Wollstonecraft’s argument against a continuum between humans and animals 
becomes apparent. As Eileen Hunt Botting has discussed, for Wollstonecraft, humans, unlike 
animals, have the capacity for reason and therefore have natural political rights (an argument 
she develops in more detail in the Vindication of the Rights of Woman) (2016, 97). However, 
this is not a triumphant statement. Humans only inherit ‘improveable faculties’, the capacity to 
reason. This capacity has to be acted upon, and is not self-fulfilling. Wollstonecraft reiterates 
that this is not an inevitable process. The improvement of individuals and of society can be 
reversed, a threat made more urgent by Burke’s claims: ‘There is no end to this implicit 
submission to authority - some where it must stop, or we return to barbarism; and the capacity 
of improvement, which gives us a natural sceptre on earth, is a cheat, an ignis-fatuus, that leads 
us from inviting meadows into bogs and dung-hills’ (23). Reason and improvement must be 
protected and cherished, Wollstonecraft declares, or humans face the possibility of sliding 
down the scale that separates them from animals. 
 
Burke emphasises the corporeality of his political tenets, their basis in physical human 
relations, in contrast to the ‘metaphysical abstraction’ of the revolutionists (93). He connects 
such embodiment with key aspects of his creed, in particular his defence of ‘prejudice’, which 
he presents as the result of ‘untaught feelings’ (182): 
We have not yet been completely embowelled of our natural entrails; we still feel within 
us, and we cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are… the active 
monitors of our duty… We have not been drawn and trussed, in order that we may be 
filled, like stuffed birds in a museum, with chaff and rags, and paltry blurred shreds of 
paper about the rights of man. We preserve the whole of our feelings still native and 
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entire… We have real hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms. We fear God; 
we look up with awe to kings… and with respect to nobility. Why? Because when such 
ideas are brought before our minds, it is natural to be so affected (181). 
Here the ‘inbred sentiments’ which enable reverence for the inherited past and the status quo 
are associated explicitly with physical feeling. In his reference to ‘entrails’ Burke alludes to 
the consent of the different parts of the body, centred in the guts (Fairclough 33-34). Dwan and 
Bullard have both noted the ‘rational dimension’ of prejudice for Burke, but in this passage he 
makes it a ‘natural’ product of the body (Dwan 588; Bullard 169). 
 
In the Vindication Wollstonecraft counters Burke’s suggestion that revolutionary discourse 
negates the body. She declares: ‘I still preserve my bowels; my heart is human, beats quick 
with human sympathies - and I fear God!’ (78). However, she suggests that Burke flirts with a 
corporeality that threatens human reason: 
What do you mean by inbred sentiments? From whence do they come? How were they 
bred? Are they the brood of folly, which swarm like the insects on the banks of the Nile, 
when mud and putrefaction have enriched the languid soil?... The appetites are the only 
perfect inbred powers that I can discern; and they like instincts have a certain aim, they 
can be satisfied – but improveable reason has not yet discovered the perfection it may 
arrive at – God forbid! (74-75). 
While Burke connects the instincts of the body with social and political structures, 
Wollstonecraft relegates ‘inbred sentiments’ exclusively to the behaviour of animals. 
Throughout the passage, she notes the difficulties that beset attempts to employs reason:  
[W]hen we eagerly pursue any study, we only reach the boundary set to human 
enquiries… But these are only the trials of contemplative minds, the foundation of 
virtue remains firm. - The power of exercising our understanding raises us above the 
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brutes; and this exercise produces that ‘primary morality,’ which you term ‘untaught 
feelings’ (77). 
Wollstonecraft praises difficulty, because in overcoming such obstacles, humans develop 
reason, virtue and ‘morality’. Such morality is not an instinct, but is attained through the 
exercise of reason. Thus, Wollstonecraft declares: ‘If virtue be an instinct, I renounce all hope 
of immortality’ (77); such instinctive behaviour would preclude the improvement of society 
and make humans no more than animals, and, as Sapiro notes, ‘gross inequality, violence and 
indignities for the vast majority… [would be] all there is’ (52). 
 
As Wollstonecraft notes, Burke’s emphasis on fellow feeling does not preclude distinctions 
between the privileges of rich and poor. Indeed, in the Reflections, his ‘inbred sentiments’ 
necessitate strict inequalities: ‘Good order is the foundation of all good things. To be enabled 
to acquire, the people… must be tractable and obedient. The magistrate must have his 
reverence, the laws their authority. The body of the people must not find the principles of 
natural subordination, by art rooted out of their minds’ (360). Burke declares the distinction 
between the ‘people’ and their rulers to be natural. In the Vindication Wollstonecraft counters 
such rhetoric by noting that ‘among all your plausible arguments, and witty illustrations, your 
contempt for the poor always appears conspicuous’ (142). This ‘contempt’ takes the form of 
promoting that brutalization which threatens the reason that make humans human. 
Wollstonecraft notes that even Burke’s calls for benevolence dehumanize the poor, by offering 
them as charity what they should claim as a right: ‘If the poor are in distress, [the rich] will 
make some benevolent exertions to assist them… Benevolence is a very amiable specious 
quality; yet the aversion which men feel to accept a right as a favour, should… be extolled as 
a vestige of native dignity’ (133). The result of the inequalities shored up by such ‘benevolence’ 
is mutual mistrust. She notes: ‘The poor consider the rich as their lawful prey; but we ought 
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not too severely to animadvert on their ingratitude’ (133). Wollstonecraft’s use of animal 
imagery signals the pernicious effects of Burke’s distinction between rich and poor, his 
tendency ‘to consider the poor as only the live stock of an estate, the feather of hereditary 
nobility’ (32). Those in need will indeed display the behaviour of animals, but that may be in 
submission or aggression. 
 
In the Vindication, Wollstonecraft mostly sets aside her concerns about the brutality of the 
poor. Instead she focuses her critique on Burke’s descriptions of political collectives. Burke’s 
most infamous account of the revolutionary mob comes in his account of the march from Paris 
to Versailles and invasion of the palace of Versailles on the night of 5-6 October 1789. He 
declares: 
A band of cruel ruffians and assassins, reeking with… blood, rushed into the chamber 
of the queen, and pierced with an hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed, 
from whence this persecuted woman had but just had time to fly almost naked … [T]he 
royal captives… were slowly moved along, amidst the horrid yells, and shrilling 
screams, and frantic dances, and infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable 
abominations of the furies of hell, in the abused shape of the vilest of women (165). 
Burke appeals for special sympathy for the royal family, declaring that ‘[i]nfluenced by the 
inborn feelings of my nature… the exalted rank of the persons suffering… adds not a little to 
my sensibility on that most melancholy occasion’ (168). Burke’s appeal to ‘inborn feelings’ 
anticipates Wollstonecraft’s statement that he is the ‘slave of impulse’, and in her response to 
this passage in the Vindication, she draws parallels between Burke’s account of the rioters and 
his own instinctive responses, reversing his claims for the inhumanity of the poor. Quoting 
Burke’s ‘horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances’, Wollstonecraft responds: 
‘Probably you mean women who gained a livelihood by selling vegetables or fish, who never 
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had had any advantages of education; or their vices might have lost part of their abominable 
deformity, by losing part of their grossness’ (67-68). Wollstonecraft skewers Burke’s 
aestheticizing of inequality in the Reflections, by quoting his words back at him, but more 
importantly, she refuses his attempt to dehumanize the rioters, noting that this is acquired, not 
‘natural’ behaviour. These women are not condemned by biology to be sub-human; they may 
develop improving reason if they are given access to education.i Wollstonecraft notes that 
Burke, in contrast to the rioters who have no choice, wilfully jettisons his own humanity in his 
perverse appeal to feeling. 
 
Wollstonecraft thus uses Burke as a cautionary example. By appealing solely to sensibility, 
which ‘never received the regal stamp of reason’, he acts solely on instinct. Wollstonecraft 
expands on the nature and effects of this instinct: 
A kind of mysterious instinct is supposed to reside in the soul, that instantaneously 
discerns truth, without the tedious labour of ratiocination. This instinct, for I know not 
what other name to give it, has been termed common sense, and more 
frequently sensibility; and, by a kind of indefeasible right, it has been supposed… to 
reign paramount over the other faculties of the mind (68-69). 
Wollstonecraft builds on her critique of Burke’s appeal to ‘nature’ to show that he makes 
unthinking ‘instinct’ paramount. Such instinct resists analysis and interrogation and therefore 
insists on its authority, though it is inconsistent, its ‘point is always shifting’ (69). 
Wollstonecraft demystifies claims to sensibility, demonstrating the distinction between such 
claims and those of virtuous humanity, as ‘virtue is really an acquisition of the individual, and 
not the blind impulse of unerring instinct’ (70). Despite Burke’s claims, he comes closer to 
animal behaviour than the rioters he condemns: 
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In what respect are we superior to the brute creation, if intellect is not allowed to be 
the guide of passion? Brutes hope and fear, love and hate; but, without a capacity to 
improve… they neither acquire virtue nor wisdom. - Why? Because the Creator has not 
given them reason. But the cultivation of reason is an arduous task, and men of lively 
fancy, finding it easier to follow the impulse of passion, endeavour to persuade 
themselves and others that it is most natural (70-71).  
Wollstonecraft’s language in the Vindication closely echoes her insistence in the Analytical 
Review piece that humanity must be cultivated and kept distinct from animal behaviour. 
Burke’s appeals to ‘nature’, therefore, show him again unwilling to undertake the difficulty, 
the ‘arduous task’ of attempting ‘the cultivation of reason’ and therefore compromising the 
distinction between man and brutes.  
 
3. Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution 
Wollstonecraft’s rejoinders in the Vindication to Burke’s claims in the Reflections are 
structured by her understanding of the distinction between instinctive and reasoned behaviour, 
and between humans and animals. However, Wollstonecraft does not consider the latter 
distinction as categorical. Rather, the behaviour of humans and animals exists on a scale which 
may shift. In the Vindication Wollstonecraft uses this understanding to criticise Burke’s 
methods and ideas, in particular his man of feeling persona, and his phobic accounts of the 
lower classes. But despite the differences in their accounts of the animal-like behaviour of the 
poor, both Wollstonecraft and Burke display anxiety about the social and political effects of 
the poor acting en masse. While Wollstonecraft sets aside such anxiety in the Vindication, she 
finds it more difficult to do so in her Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution. 
Wollstonecraft remains opposed to Burke in both her partisanship and her philosophical 
account of reason, and she attacks Burke’s accounts of the mob. Yet at times her accounts come 
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close to those of Burke. This shift is not just a reaction to the increased violence of 
revolutionary collective action in France. It is also tied to Wollstonecraft’s sense that 
commercial corruption and counter-revolutionary backlash might stymie the improvement of 
individuals and nations (Keane 2000a, 33).  
 
In the Historical and Moral View Wollstonecraft moves between a representation of the 
Revolution as individual and social improvement in action, and more anxious worries about 
violence and reaction. To a greater degree than in the Vindication, Wollstonecraft sees people 
of different social ranks acting against each others’ interests: 
It is a palpable errour to suppose, that men of every class are not equally susceptible of 
common improvement: if therefore it be the contrivance of any government, to preclude 
from a chance of improvement the greater part of the citizens of the state, it can be 
considered in no other light than as a monstrous tyranny... For all the advantages of 
civilization cannot be felt, unless it pervades the whole mass, humanizing every 
description of men (Works 6, 220). 
Wollstonecraft offers a positive vision of improvable reason as a universal human 
characteristic, but she also articulates a gloomy account of the way ‘tyranny’ functions to 
‘preclude from a change of improvement the greater part of the citizens of the state’ (Sapiro 
94). 
 
Events in France certainly offer Wollstonecraft examples of the improvement she had 
attempted to conjure in her earlier writings: ‘Reason has, at last, shown her captivating face, 
beaming with benevolence… The image of God implanted in our nature is now more rapidly 
expanding; and, as it opens, liberty with maternal wing seems to be soaring to regions far above 
vulgar annoyance, promising to shelter all mankind’ (Works 6, 22). Here reason has divine 
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qualities; it is the faculty which link humans with God. The success of this ‘new spirit [that] 
has gone forth’ is all the more remarkable, given that the people of France had been treated 
like animals for so long. Certainly it proves too novel for the authorities to diagnose and contain 
in the early days of the revolution: ‘the court [were] still so stupidly secure as not to see, that 
the people, who at this period dared to think for themselves, would not now be noosed like 
beasts… heard with astonishment the bold tones of men speaking of their rights (Works 6, 44). 
Yet the legacy of the brutalising effects of inequality is difficult to overcome, and 
Wollstonecraft presents incidents in which the response to such brutalization is retribution and 
violence. 
 
Wollstonecraft notes that acts of violence are not the result of the moment, but are produced 
by long-standing systems of inequality, and that time is required to undo such damage. In 
making these claims, she echoes her earlier arguments that reasoned improvement is always 
more salutary than instinctive action, even if that action is benevolent: 
People are rendered ferocious by misery; and misanthropy is ever the offspring of 
discontent. Let not then the happiness of one half of mankind be built on the misery of 
the other, and humanity will take place of charity…  
Several acts of ferocious folly have justly brought much obloquy on the grand 
revolution, which has taken place in France; yet… the people are essentially good… 
knowledge is rapidly advancing to that degree of perfectibility, when the proud 
distinctions of sophisticating fools will be eclipsed by the mild rays of philosophy, and 
man be considered as man (Works 6, 46). 
The sudden movements of this passage between hope and condemnation, diagnosis of present 
corruption and prediction of future ‘perfectibility’ seems characteristic of the complexity of 
Wollstonecraft’s task in the Historical and Moral View. Perhaps following the example of her 
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natural history reading, she treats events in France as a test of the potential for human 
improvement, but events in practice serve to complicate that narrative. 
 
Wollstonecraft’s representations of collective political action offer striking examples of her 
mixed enthusiasm and concern. She praises the ‘public spirited dignity [which] pervaded the 
whole mass’ at the fall of the Bastille and in its aftermath (Works 6, 97, 100). But later events 
prove less easy to defend, as Wollstonecraft acknowledges that both the nobility and the people 
consult their feelings over reason: 
So weak is the tenderness produced merely by sympathy… compared with the 
humanity of a cultivated understanding. Alas! - It is morals, not feelings, which 
distinguish men from the beasts of prey… [W]hilst despotism and superstition exist, 
the convulsions, which the regeneration of man occasions, will always bring forward 
the vices they have engendered (Works 6, 127). 
While Wollstonecraft’s account of such ‘convulsions’ tend to share the blame between the 
people and the nobility, at times she offers phobic accounts of collective action distinct from 
anything in the Vindication. 
 
Wollstonecraft returns to the events of 5-6 October 1789, which enabled her in the Vindication 
to condemn both Burke’s treatment of the mob, and his own impulsive thinking. In this new 
account, rather than show the rioters as possessed of innate if neglected humanity, she suggests 
they are void of reason, which leaves them open to exploitation: 
From the enjoyment of more freedom than the women of other parts of the world, those 
of France have acquired more independence of spirit than any others; it has, therefore, 
been the scheme of designing men… [to work] them up to some desperate act, and then 
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terming it a folly, because merely the rage of women, who were supposed to be actuated 
only by the emotions of the moment (Works 6, 195). 
Wollstonecraft sustains a degree of pity for the women rioters, and presents them as an example 
of the broader inequalities she critiques in the Vindication of the Rights of Woman. But in her 
long description of the attack on Versailles her prose takes on characteristics of Burke’s 
account of the same event. In the early part of her account, she attempts to distinguish between 
this mob, and the positive forms of collective action which she had earlier praised: ‘The 
concourse… consisted mostly of market women, and the lowest refuse of the streets… They 
were strictly speaking a mob, affixing all the odium to the appellation it can possibly import; 
and not to be confounded with the honest multitude, who took the Bastille’ (Works 6, .220). As 
Wollstonecraft’s account continues, however, it proves more and more difficult to sustain this 
distinction between ‘public spirit’ and instinctive riotous action. 
 
Like Burke, Wollstonecraft describes the crowd in inhuman terms: ‘the restless mob… began 
to prowl about... the whole gang of ruffians, rushed towards the palace, and… entered like a 
torrent’ (Works 6, 204). Again following Burke, Wollstonecraft saves her sternest 
condemnation for those who attempted violence on the queen, decrying ‘the fury of the 
monsters, who were still hunting after blood or plunder’ (Works 6, 205).ii Yet Wollstonecraft 
distinguishes her account from Burke’s, suggesting that her choice of inhuman imagery is a 
deliberate strategy to condemn the transgressions of this particular event, and not all collective 
action. The rioters at Versailles are monstrous because their action is exceptional. It is ‘one of 
the blackest of the machinations that have… disgraced the dignity of man, and sullied the 
annals of humanity… [T]hese wretches… show[ed] in every instance, by the difference of their 
conduct, that they were a set of monsters, distinct from the people’ (Works 6, 206). 
Wollstonecraft returns to her distinction between humane and brutal behaviour, but it is 
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difficult to trace a clear distinction in the chaos of the events of the Revolution. She expresses 
disappointment that the National Assembly of France does not uphold such distinctions by 
condemning the behaviour of the rioters. She notes that this ‘omission’ is likely to 
produce the most fatal consequences, because impunity never fails to stimulate the 
wretches… to commit… still more atrocious crimes; and it is by suspending the decrees 
of justice, that hardened miscreants, made so by oppression, give full scope to all the 
brutality of their sanguinary dispositions… 
The altar of humanity had been profaned - The dignity of freedom had been 
tarnished… Yet these brutes were permitted triumphantly to escape - and dignified with 
the appellation of the people (Works 6, 209). 
Wollstonecraft insists that for the aims of the Revolution to be realised, the principles by which 
its actors are motivated must be analysed and articulated. The excesses of mobs can be 
explained if they are understood as exceptions to the diffusion of reason through the people. 
But by failing to condemn the actions of the mob at Versailles as such an exception, the 
National Assembly makes them representative of the Revolution, thereby connecting its 
principles with the actions of ‘brutes’ rather than of ‘humanity’.  
 
Events in France shake Wollstonecraft’s optimism for the improvement of society. The march 
on Versailles and response of the National Assembly demonstrate that the French people are 
not a straightforward example of the principles of humanity in action. Rather, they demonstrate 
the ease with which humankind might slide back down the scale to brutality (Taylor 206). 
Wollstonecraft’s critique of instinctive action is a highly effective counter to Burke’s rhetoric, 
but it proves difficult to sustain in 1794. However Wollstonecraft is determined to end the 
Historical and Moral View on a hopeful note, and in doing so, she adopts a bodily metaphor. 
She declares of France: 
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[A]s in medicine there is a species of complaint in the bowels which works its own 
cure, and, leaving the body healthy, gives an invigorated tone to the system, so there is 
in politics: and whilst the agitation of its regeneration continues, the excrementitious 
humours exuding from the contaminated body will excite a general dislike and 
contempt for the nation; and it is only the philosophical eye… that will be able to 
discern the cause, which has produced so many dreadful effects (Works 6, 220). 
This image enables Wollstonecraft to make a positive case for the future of France. Like the 
body, political states find their own equilibrium, and what looks like poison and disorder might 
be incipient cure. But this image is very different from the discourse Wollstonecraft has taken 
from natural history, and deployed against Burke. Wollstonecraft does not discuss actual bodies 
here, but uses the analogy of the body politic. Only at this level of abstraction can she offer a 
firmly positive vision of the future. Meanwhile Wollstonecraft’s claims for the rational 
improvement of individuals and social structures are muted, if not abandoned. 
 
 
i As Marso notes, Wollstonecraft’s ‘analysis of the market women is entirely in keeping with 
her… comments on gender in the Vindication of the Rights of Woman.’ (50). See also 
Youssef, who emphasises the radical and unusual nature of Wollstonecraft’s stance (Youssef 
2015). 
ii Keane and Jones note that Wollstonecraft follows a number of conservative commentators 
here (Keane 2000b, 116-17; Jones 302-3). 
                                                        
